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The US Department of Energy decided in 2000 to 
treat its sodium-bonded spent nuclear fuel, produced 
for experiments on breeder reactors, with an 
electrochemical process. The metallic waste produced 
is to be cast into ingots and the salt waste further 
processed to form a ceramic waste form for disposal in 
a mined repository. However, alternative disposal 
pathways for metallic and salt waste streams are being 
investigated that may reduce the processing complexity. 
As summarized here, performance assessments 
analyzing the direct disposal the salt waste demonstrate 
that both mined repositories in salt and deep boreholes 
in basement crystalline rock can easily accommodate 
the salt waste. Also summarized here is an analysis of 
the feasibility of transporting the salt waste in a 
proposed vessel. The vessel is viable for transport to 
and disposal in a generic mined repository in salt or 
deep borehole but a portion of the salt waste would need 
to be diluted for disposal in the Waste Isolation Pilot 
Plant. The generally positive results continue to 
demonstrate the feasibility of direct disposal of salt 
waste after electrochemical processing of spent nuclear 
fuel. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
For experiments on reactors breeding plutonium, 
the US Department of Energy (DOE) tested a fuel with 
a layer of metallic sodium (Na). Directly disposing of 
this Na-bonded spent nuclear fuel (SNF) from these 
reactors without treatment in a geologic repository is 
not possible because of the potentially energetic 
reaction of the sodium metal with water to produce 
hydrogen gas and sodium hydroxide. Hence, DOE 
decided in 2000 to treat this Na-bonded SNF with an 
electrochemical process. The electrochemical process 
produces a metallic waste, which is mostly from the 
cladding, and a salt waste, which contains many of the 
actinides and fission products. 1 The current plan is for 
the salt waste to be further processed to form a ceramic 
waste form for disposal in a mined repository.  
Yet other disposal paths are viable for the salt 
waste. Summarized here are performance assessments 
analyzing the direct disposal of salt waste (without 
treating it to form a ceramic waste form) in mined 
repositories in salt and deep boreholes in basement 
crystalline rock. This paper also discusses the feasibility 
of transporting a proposed disposal vessel and whether 
any issues would suggest that a smaller or larger size is 
more appropriate. This practical question addresses the 
issue as to whether it is necessary to develop plans and 
secure funding to modify facilities at Idaho National 
Laboratory (INL) in order for direct disposal of the salt 
waste to be feasible. 
II. BACKGROUND ON ER SALT WASTE AND 
DIRECT DISPOSAL OPTION 
II.A. Na-Bonded SNF 
The Na-bonded driver fuel in the core of the 
experimental fast-spectrum breeder reactor consisted of 
highly enriched uranium (HEU) metal alloyed with 10 
wt.% zirconium. The blanket fuel surrounding the 
reactor core for breeding the plutonium consisted of 
depleted uranium. Both the HEU metal-zirconium alloy 
driver and blanket fuel is surrounded by a layer of 
metallic Na and a layer of cladding to improve heat 
transfer. The cladding for the driver fuel was either D9, 
HT9, or 316 stainless steel. The cladding for the blanket 
fuel was predominately 304 stainless steel.  
DOE has ~3.3 metric tons of heavy metal (MTHM) 
of driver SNF (~65% 235U enriched at discharge) and 
22.4 MTHM of blanket SNF from the experimental 
breeder reactor (EBR-II) at INL,1 and ~0.25 MTHM 
driver SNF from the Fast Flux Test Reactor (FFTF) at 
Hanford.2 
II.B. ER Salt Waste 
For treating the experimental Na-bonded SNF, 
DOE decided to use two electrorefiners (ER) located in 
the Fuel Conditioning Facility (FCF) at INL. The Mark-
IV ER would process the driver SNF. The Mark-V ER 
would process the blanket SNF.  
In the ERs, a batch of chopped SNF is placed in 
anode metal baskets and immersed in a 500 oC molten 
LiCl and KCl salt near its eutectic concentration. When 
current is passed through the metal baskets, fission 
products and actinides are oxidized and readily dissolve 
into the molten eutectic salt as chloride salts. The 
uranium is reduced to its metallic form and accumulates 
on the cathode. The uranium (~65% enriched) can be 
recovered, diluted to <20% enrichment by adding 
depleted uranium, and cast into ingots.  
The irradiated cladding and most of the zirconium 
in the driver U-Zr SNF does not oxidize and dissolve 
into the salt, but rather remains in the anode basket. 
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Some noble metal activation products also remain with 
the anode basket such as Mo, Tc, Ru, Rh, and Pd. The 
existing metallic waste form (MWF) has been cast into 
3 circular ingots in the furnace operating in the Hot 
Fuels Examination Facility (HFEF) at INL since 2012. 
Current plans call for the circular ingots to be placed in 
standard high-level waste (HLW) canisters (nominally 
61 cm diameter and 3 m tall) for disposal (~5850 kg or 
488 ingots from ~26 MTHM of EBR-II SNF.  
Many of the fission yield products and actinides 
from the SNF, remain in the 400 kg of molten LiCl-KCl 
salt an ER. Eventually, the salt will be removed from 
each ER. Reasons include (a) reducing radionuclide 
concentration to avoid criticality concerns from 239Pu 
and possibly some 235U, (b) reducing the Na content to 
keep the melting point of the salt mixture below 500 oC, 
(c) reducing the actinides and fission products in the salt 
such that decay heat does not prevent solidification once 
removed from the ER, and (d) the ER is to be 
decommissioned. 
II.C. Baseline Pathway for Treating ER Waste 
Although electrochemical processing was 
developed for treating the Na-bonded EBR-II SNF,1 its 
use is far more general and could have great promise for 
treating other DOE-managed SNF, especially small 
amounts of HEU SNF.3 Yet, for this technology to 
succeed in the US, a path to safe disposition of the 
resulting salt waste must be shown.  
Because of the chloride salts, vitrification of the ER 
salt waste as borosilicate glass is not feasible. The 
current disposal pathway for the ER salt waste is to form 
a glass-bonded sodalite composite ceramic (referred to 
as a ceramic waste form or CWF).4 The processing 
consists of removing the molten salt, solidifying, 
crushing, adding ground zeolite, and heating to 500 oC. 
This salt loaded zeolite is then mixed with a glass binder 
and heated to 925 oC in a furnace to form the CWF 
cylinders (Fig. 1).3 The waste treatment equipment is to 
be located in the HFEF. Both the FCF and HFEF are at 
the Materials and Fuels Complex (MFC). As currently 
planned, 2 CWF cylinders are to be placed into a 
standard HLW canister and the HLW canister shipped 
to mined repository with other DOE-managed HLW 
and SNF. About 64 HLW canisters would be produced 
from processing EBR-II SNF.2 
II.D. Direct Disposal Pathways for ER Salt Waste 
Examining other disposal paths for the ER salt 
waste is prudent because of (1) the de facto stoppage of 
the nation’s first proposed mined repository in volcanic 
tuff at Yucca Mountain, Nevada, (2) the complexity of 
creating the ceramic waste form, (3) the large increase 
in mass volume of ER salt waste caused by CWF 
treatment, and (4) the limited space in the HFEF hot 
cells to accommodate the necessary equipment. 
To elaborate upon the latter two points, 1.72 metric 
tons (MT) of EBR-II waste produces 50.95 MT of 
CWF.4 Furthermore, the CWF equipment is large and 
would occupy a significant portion of the HFEF hot cell, 
which would likely preclude using HFEF for most other 
experimental purposes for the 3 to 5 years necessary to 
complete treatment.4 
II.D.1. Three Direct Disposal Pathways 
The direct disposal option involves sending the ER 
salt waste directly to a repository without further 
treatment. Three direct disposal pathways exist for ER 
salt waste (Fig. 1). One pathway is to send the waste to 
a future deep borehole repository.  
A second pathway is to send ER salt waste to a 
mined repository for commercial and/or defense waste. 
Until the proposed repository at Yucca Mountain, 
Nevada, came to a de facto stop in 2010 because of a 
lack of funding, this was the anticipated pathway, but 
with treatment of the ER salt waste to produce CWF. 
This pathway depends upon renewed Administrative 
and Congressional support for a commercial repository 
or a repository for only defense related waste. 
II.D.2. Disposal at WIPP 
The third pathway is to send the portion of ER salt 
waste that meets the definition of defense related remote 
handled transuranic (RH-TRU) waste to the Waste 
Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) located in bedded salt in 
southern New Mexico (Fig. 1).  
The Waste Isolation Pilot Plant Land Withdrawal 
Act sets several limits on TRU waste: (1) volume is 
limited to 1.76 ×105 m3 (6.2×106 ft3); (2) total activity 
of RH-TRU is limited to 5.1×106 Ci; and (3) activity 
concentration for RH-TRU waste is limited to 2.3×104 
Ci/m3 (averaged over the canister volume).  
II.E. Vessels for ER Salt Waste 
II.E.1. Primary Salt Container 
Direct disposal would involve placing the 
contaminated molten ER salt waste into a primary salt 
container (PSC) to cool. In concept, 3 sizes were 
considered for the PSC, but not all 3 sizes would make 
sense for the 3 disposal pathways. Specifically, the 3 
PSC considered were (1) proposed baseline PSC for use 
in standard truck cask for shipment of RH-TRU to 
WIPP, (2) a smaller PSC for use in shipping contact 
handled transuranic (CH-TRU) waste to WIPP, and (3) 
a larger PSC for shipping via rail to a future mined 
repository for commercial and DOE-managed SNF. 
I.E.2. Proposed Primary Salt Container 
A vessel for direct disposal of ER salt waste has 
been proposed, designed, and a prototype manufactured 
based on the current configuration of the HFEF and 
commonly used handling containers at the facility. As 
proposed, the PSC would be constructed of 316 
stainless steel with a salt capacity of 43 kg.  
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Fig. 1. Various Pathways for Disposal of Na-Bonded SNF from EBR-II and FFTF. 
The estimated total mass of salt waste produced 
from the treatment of the 22.4 MTHM blanket SNF in 
the Mark-V ER is 699 kg.4 The estimated total salt 
mass from processing the ~3.4 MTHM of the driver 
SNF in the Mark IV ER is 1017 kg. Hence, 17 PSCs 
are needed for the Mark-V ER salt waste and 24 PSCs 
are needed for the Mark-IV ER salt waste.  
However, because of the statutory limit on 
activity concentration at WIPP (2.3×104 Ci/m3), Mark 
IV ER salt waste concentration would be constrained. 
The precise amount would depend on the packaging 
since the concentration is averaged over the volume of 
the disposal canister. As described later, the payload 
canister for the RH-TRU 72-B truck cask for WIPP is 
0.9 m3. Consequently, a PSC for the Mark IV must be 
a factor of 3 smaller or the salt waste diluted by a factor 
of 3, based on the activity of Mark IV waste (Table 1). 
In the latter situation, 72 PSCs would be produced for 
a total of 89 PSCs (Fig. 1). 
Table 1. Activity and thermal power in 2013 for 86 kg of 
ER salt waste in 2 primary salt containers. 
  Mark IV  Mark V 
Duration 
beyond 
2013 
Activity 
(kCi) 
Dilute 
Factor 
of 3 
Power 
(W) 
Dilute 
Factor 
of 3 
Activity 
(kCi) 
Power  
(W) 
0 160.6 53.5 327.2 109.1 48.6 24.9 
1 119.6 39.9 322.0 107.3 4.8 24.6 
10 63.7 21.2 261.8 87.3 3.3 21.9 
30 43.6 14.5 166.1 55.4 2.3 17.5 
100 7.8 2.6 26.2 8.7 0.6 12.0 
I.E.2. Proposed Primary Salt Container 
A vessel for direct disposal of ER salt waste has 
been proposed, designed, and a prototype 
manufactured based on the current configuration of the 
HFEF and commonly used handling containers at the 
facility. As proposed, the PSC would be constructed 
of 316 stainless steel with a salt capacity of 43 kg.  
II.E.4. Proposed HFEF Handling Canister  
The inner container would then be placed in an 
HFEF-5 canister, a standard container used to move 
material within the HFEF. Hence, the proposed 
handling vessel consists of 3 nested cylinders around 
the waste. The HFEF-5 is constructed of 304 stainless 
steel with 32.38 cm diameter and 186.69 cm length.  
II.E.5. Alternative PSC for TRUPAC-II 
A second option considered was to reduce the size 
of a PSC such that it could be used with the 
TRUPACT-II transportation cask, which was 
developed for shipping CH-TRU to WIPP. The PSC 
would be sized to fit into an 55-gallon drum using an 
overpack, such as the S200 pipe overpack.5, p. 50  
II.E.6. HLW or DOE Standard Canister Alternative 
An alternative handling canister would be to place 
the HFEF-5 canister inside either a standard HLW 
canister or standard DOE canister for DOE-managed 
SNF. DOE will be developing many different types of 
baskets to support the DOE-managed SNF and a 
basket for the HFEF-5 canister could also be 
developed. A specific transportation cask has not been 
designated but would be chosen in conjunction with 
the shipment of DOE-managed SNF to a repository.  
III. SALT WASTE DISPOSAL PERFORMANCE  
III.A. Waste form and package performance  
The role of the engineered barrier system (EBS) 
differs with the host geologic media. For all 
repositories, the container of the EBS provides 
important short-term radionuclide confinement for 
operations and when retrieval might be necessary. 
Long-term container and waste form performance is 
less important for a mined repository in salt (and 
clay/shale), because the geologic natural barrier 
system provides substantial long-term isolation. For 
salt repositories, the vessel used inside the 
transportation cask is likely to be sufficient for 
disposal. Disposal of the ER salt waste in a salt 
repository is ideal because the ER salt waste form is 
stable in the saturated brines of a salt repository. 
Long-term radionuclide isolation by the EBS is 
more important for a mined repository in crystalline 
rock and volcanic tuff (when using a dose standard). 
Provided a sufficiently robust waste package is used, 
direct disposal of ER salt waste could also be viable 
for mined repositories in crystalline and volcanic rock, 
but would need to be verified with performance 
assessment (PA() analysis 
III.B. Summary of Past PA Studies 
Evaluation of the direct disposal of ER salt in a 
salt repository was initiated in 2010. In 2011 and 2012, 
work focused on laboratory studies of salt waste 
dissolution behavior in simulated salt repository 
brines.3 In 2013, direct disposal of ER salt waste 
without further treatment was demonstrated as feasible 
for a generic salt repository without other waste.6 In 
2014, the PA included a detailed thermal analysis of 
waste package size and spacing, and disposal of ER 
salt waste along with commercial and DOE-managed 
SNF and HLW. Also, in 2014, a criticality analysis 
related to ER salt transportation and disposal showed 
no concerns.6 Because of these studies, the direct 
disposal option was rated as promising in a 2014 DOE 
complex-wide evaluation of DOE-managed SNF and 
HLW.2, Table 5-7 In 2015, the analysis shifted to the 
feasibility of deep borehole disposal and 
corresponding criticality analysis. 
III.C. Influence of Salt Waste Heat on WIPP 
As currently envisioned, 1 or 2 HFEF-5 handling 
canisters would be in a standard payload canister. At 
WIPP, the standard payload canister would be put 
directly in the floor (or possibly the wall) of one of the 
disposal rooms. Previous analysis of the influence on 
performance of the ER salt waste has focused on the 
disposal in a mined repository in salt for commercial 
and/or defense-only waste or a deep borehole 
repository in crystalline rock for defense-only waste. 
For the mined repository, ER salt waste is relatively 
cooler than other waste (Fig. 2). However, at WIPP, 
the ER salt waste is relatively warmer than the CH-
TRU. Nonetheless, the performance should be 
acceptable since ER salt waste would represent such a 
small portion of the total waste at WIPP.  
 
 
Fig. 2. Heat output from ER salt waste compared to a 
HLW canister and an SNF assembly. 
To elaborate, the total heat load at WIPP was 
initially projected at ~136 kW in 1998.7 Mark IV waste 
in 2033 would represent a total 3 kW (or a change of 
2% from 136 kW) (Table 1), which will be difficult to 
observe in a PA. Granted, the additional heat load may 
be concentrated in the floor of only a few rooms; but 
this isolated and small concentrated heat load is still 
unlikely to have any adverse effects. In fact, during the 
certification of WIPP, a generic situation with a 
concentrated RH-TRU heat source was examined and 
found to be insignificant.8 Nonetheless, a PA analysis 
of this particular situation will be necessary, if WIPP 
is chosen for disposing ER salt waste. 
III.D. Deep Borehole Disposal 
The deep borehole disposal concept consists of 
drilling deep boreholes ~5 km into crystalline 
basement rock for permanent disposal of high level 
radioactive waste in the bottom 1 to 2 km. The disposal 
concept has been previously described.6; 9 Advantages 
of the concept are that migration of radionuclides from 
the deep borehole would be severely restricted by the 
low permeability in deep crystalline rocks, limited 
interaction of deep fluids with shallower groundwater, 
and geochemically reducing conditions at depth, 
which limit the solubility and enhance the sorption of 
many radionuclides. The added advantage of direct 
disposal of ER salt waste is that the high salinity 
content of the waste would further restrict radionuclide 
mobility towards the accessible environment. This 
attribute is also applicable to disposal in other 
geological media. 
III.D.1. Thermal-Hydrology Analysis Model 
Thermal-hydrology analysis investigated density 
driven flow when emplacing ER salt in a deep 
borehole. To be consistent with past analysis, the 
original decay heat in a RH-TRU 72-B payload 
disposal package (86 kg) for the ER salt waste were 
used in the simulations described here (Fig. 2).6 
The analysis includes detailed three-dimensional 
modeling using the numerical code PFLOTRAN to 
assess magnitude and direction of fluid movement in 
the vicinity of the borehole because of density 
differences between the highly saline ER salt and the 
surroundings.10 To accentuate differences, the 
surrounding crystalline rock had salinity <990 kg/m3. 
The ER salt canisters were placed over 34 m in a 200-
m section at the top of the disposal zone at a depth of 
2900 m (bottom at 3100 m). Sedimentary overburden 
would normally be present, but the model domain is 
exclusively in the crystalline rock. 
III.D.2. Thermal Analysis Results for Deep Borehole 
PFLOTRAN simulations were conducted for a 
total simulation time of 106 years. At 3000 m, there is 
a small thermal perturbation at early time as a result of 
the decay heat of the ER salt waste. As decay heat 
decreases, the temperature approaches the in situ 
temperature associated with geothermal gradient. (Fig. 
3). The vertical groundwater flow is minimal, 
particularly when compared to perturbations caused 
by emplacement of SNF in previous calculations.6  
The concentration profile at 3000-m depth 
indicates movement of fluid by advection. A small 
peak is reached at around 250 years and then much 
larger concentrations at later times (Fig. 3). 
 
Fig. 3. Temperature and salt concentration as function of 
time in borehole at 3000-m depth. 
The analysis results suggest that any contaminant 
plume released from the ER salt waste emplaced in a 
segment of borehole would move downward due to the 
density flow (Error! Reference source not found.). 
By 50,000 years, the plume has traveled ~100 m 
downward. 
 
Fig. 4. Liquid density at 20,000 years. 
IV. TRANSPORTATION OF ER SALT WASTE  
Three issues are addressed related to currently 
proposed containers and available transportation casks 
(1) shielding necessary to reduce doses to acceptable 
levels; (2) the criticality potential and the ease which 
it can be shown to be inconsequential when amending 
a transportation cask certificate of compliance (CoC), 
and (3) temperatures of the containers in relation to 
acceptable cask limits. Usually, the dose and thermal 
limits are the most important in determining the 
practical feasibility of shipping the ER salt waste. 
IV.B. Transportation Casks for Direct Disposal 
IV.B.1. RH-TRU 72-B Cask for Truck Shipments to 
WIPP and Borehole Repository 
A proposed truck cask for shipping the HFEF-5 
handling canister to WIPP or the deep borehole 
repository is the existing RH-TRU 72-B transportation 
cask, (NRC Certification 9212), which was designed 
to transport RH-TRU waste.11 The cask can transport 
a payload (including the payload canister) weighing 
3628 kg. The inner payload canister is composed of 
either carbon or 304 stainless steel with 66 cm outer 
diameter and 306 cm length. The internal volume is 
~0.9 m3 (Fig. 5).12 
 
Fig. 5. RH-TRU 72-B cask for remote-handled TRU. 
Calculations were performed with one and two 
HFEF-5 cans placed within the RH-TRU 72-B cask, 
and centrally suspended in dunnage within the payload 
vessel. Several options for dunnage were considered: 
(1) redwood cellulose (which can reasonably represent 
Celotex), (2) sand, (3) salt, and (4) a commercial 
product, polysiloxane with bismuth. Dunnage is 
assumed to be placed outside the HFEF-5 canister and 
within the lead shielding circumference of the payload 
canister. For the cases with two HFEF-5 canisters, the 
lead or depleted uranium shielding shell was treated as 
a circular envelope surrounding the containers. The 
dose calculations were performed including the 
optional steel shield in the HFEF-5 canister. 
IV.B.2. TRUPAC-II Cask for Truck Shipments to 
WIPP and Borehole Repository 
The TRUPAC-II is an alternative transportation 
cask currently available for shipping waste to WIPP. 
The TRUPACT-II transportation cask is not designed 
to provide significant gamma or neutron shielding. 
Hence, the payload contents must be shielded. The 
approved payloads are the thin-walled 55-gallon drum, 
85-gallon drum, 100-gallon drum, standard waste box, 
and 10-drum overpack. The 55-gallon drum is the 
basis of several payloads with additional internal 
components to provide either criticality control or 
additional shielding such as the S200 pipe overpack. 
Each TRUPACT-II cask can transport fourteen 55-
gallon drums. A truck can carry 3 TRUPACT-II casks. 
IV.B.3. Cask for Transport to Mined Repository for 
Commercial or Defense SNF 
In general, the thermal history for 2 PSC of Mark 
IV ER waste is like that of a generic HLW canister 
(Fig. 2). Hence, casks designed to ship vitrified HLW 
can ship ER waste. The newer casks designs are for 
rail transport of large quantities of SNF and HLW 
(e.g., 5 canisters of HLW), a weight far greater than in 
5 packages of ER waste containing 2 PSC per package. 
The maximum heat load is ~20 kW, which roughly 
corresponds to 65 packages of ER waste (Table 1).  
IV.C. Shielding Necessary in Payload Canister for 
Transport to WIPP and Borehole Repository 
IV.C.1. NRC Dose Limitations for Casks 
For normal conditions of transport, the Nuclear 
Regulatory Commission (NRC), under 10 CFR 71, 
requires that (1) dose is < 2 mSv/h (200 mrem/h) on 
surface of the transportation cask and (2) dose is < 0.1 
mSv/h (10 mrem/hr) 2 m from cask surface (§71.47).  
IV.C.2. Calculation Method 
The required thickness of lead or depleted 
uranium shielding in addition to shielding provided by 
the dunnage and nested steel containers was 
determined by trial and error to find acceptable doses 
at the exterior of the transportation cask. The dose 
calculations were performed with the MAVRIC-
MONACO code sequence of SCALE v6.1 The source 
term was Mark IV (without a factor of 3 dilution).  
IV.C.3. Doses Outside RH-TRU 72-B 
When shipping one HFEF-5 canister with the 
optional pipe shielding in the RH-TRU 72-B 
transportation cask with redwood dunnage (Fig. 6), ~ 
0.5 cm layer of addition lead shielding or 0.35 cm layer 
of depleted uranium shielding is required. When salt, 
sand, or commercially available polysiloxane with 
bismuth is used as a dunnage, no addition lead or 
depleted uranium shielding is necessary. 
 
Fig. 6. RH-TRU 72-B cask with dunnage (purple region) 
and additional shielding when transporting one HFEF-5  
When shipping two HFEF-5 canisters in the RH-
TRU 72-B transportation cask with redwood dunnage, 
~1 cm thick layer of addition lead shielding or ~0.65 
cm thick layer of depleted uranium shielding is 
required. When salt is used as a dunnage, an additional 
shielding layer of lead ~0.75 cm thick or depleted 
uranium 0.33 cm thick is necessary. With polysiloxane 
and bismuth as dunnage, no addition lead or uranium 
shielding is necessary. 
IV.C.4. Doses Outside TRUPACT-II Cask 
An overpack for a small PSC that is adequate for 
transporting ER salt waste in 55-gallon drums used in 
TRUPACT-II cask does not currently exist. Adding 
lead shielding to an existing two variations of the S200 
pipe overpack would leave space for only 4.4 or 7.4 kg 
of ER waste and the mass of lead would exceed the 
currently approved limits. Use of the TRUPACT-II 
cask for transporting ER salt waste will require (1) 
developing a specific overpack for a small alternative 
PSC, (2) testing the overpack in a drop test and fire test 
(possibly numerically), and (3) modifying the CH-
TRAMPAC (documentation associated with the safety 
analysis report—SAR—for TRUPACT-II)  
IV.D. Lack of Criticality Potential  
In general, no known characteristic of ER waste 
would make transportation or disposal very difficult. 
However, the Pu concentration in ER salt waste is 
higher than commercial SNF and defense related high 
level waste (i.e., ~3 wt.% PuCl3 in the Mark-IV ER 
salt and ~6 wt.% PuCl3 in the Mark-V ER salt), which 
would require separate analysis (1) as to the potential 
for criticality during storage, transportation, and 
disposal, and (2) any safeguards and security risks.  
IV.D.1. Calculation Method 
The potential of criticality in the ER salt waste 
while transported in an RH-TRU 72-B cask was 
estimated with the XSDRNPM module of SCALE. 
The multiplication factor for an infinite medium of ER 
salt waste (kinf) was <0.7. An effective multiplication 
factor for ER waste in the actual configuration (keff) 
was also calculated using the KENO-IV Monte Carlo 
capability in SCALE.  
IV.D.2. Low Criticality Potential 
The RH-TRU 72-B CoC limits Pu fissile mass to 
315 fissile gram equivalent (FGE) or 370 FGE if ≥25 
g of 240Pu is present.11; 13 However, keff <<1, regardless 
of the dunnage and shielding used, because the fissile 
material is uniformly dispersed in a neutron absorbing 
chloride salt in the ER salt waste. Hence, criticality 
during transportation is not of practical concern, but 
will require an CoC amendment.  
IV.D.3. Physical Protection 
Safeguards and security may have to be addressed 
because of the 2 to 5 kg of 239Pu in 2 PSCs. However, 
the attractiveness of the ER salt waste to theft, 
diversion, or sabotage is very low. 
IV.E. Influence of Shielding on RH-TRU 72-B 
Temperatures 
IV.E.1. Heat Load Limits 
The WIPP waste acceptance criteria (WAC) limit 
all payload canisters to that specified in the CH-
TRAMPAC and RH-TRAMPAC. The maximum 
thermal heat load for shipping non-combustible 
metallic waste used in the SAR for the RH-TRU 72-B 
cask is 300 W. The maximum thermal heat load for a 
one drum container for the TRUPACT-II cask is 50 W. 
This limit is in place because some canisters shipping 
to WIPP may contain combustible waste, and it is 
desirable to limit the potential for radiolysis generating 
hydrogen gas while being transported.  
IV.E.2. Thermal Load of Source 
As noted previously, the thermal history for 2 
PSC of Mark IV ER waste is similar to generic HLW 
or relatively cool DOE-managed waste (Fig. 2). 
Granted, the projected initial thermal power output is 
327.2 W in 2 PSC in 2013 (Table 1). But after a little 
more than 4 years (2017), the thermal output for 2 PSC 
in 1 HFEF-5 canister will be less than the 300-W limit 
for non-combustible, metallic waste in the RH-TRU 
72-B cask.  
After 10 years, up to 16 kg of the Mark IV salt 
waste could be placed in a small PSC container and 
meet the 50 W limit for TRUPACT-II (Table 1).  
IV.E.3 Influence of shielding on cask temperatures 
Based on a finite-element thermal model of the 
RH-TRU 72-B the thermal loads from the proposed 
ER salt waste inside HFEF-5 canister with additional 
shielding is acceptable for a 300-W source under 
normal conditions of transport (NCT). For example, 
the temperature on the cask surface is ~34 oC above 
the ambient temperature of 37.8 oC (Fig. 7). 
 
Fig. 7. Temperatures within RH-TRU 72-B with 2 PSCs 
at 300 W inside a standard payload canister as calculated 
by ANSYS (Rev 17.1) for normal transport conditions. 
V. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
As summarized here, PAs analyzing the disposal 
of ER salt waste directly (without treating it to form a 
glass ceramic) show that both mined repositories in 
salt and deep boreholes in basement crystalline rock 
can easily accommodate the ER salt waste. For deep 
borehole disposal, a container diameter must be small; 
but in general, these PAs verify the usual adage that if 
SNF or high-level radioactive waste (HLW) can be 
transported to the repository under US regulations, it 
can be disposed under US regulations, provided 
social-political limitations on the type and amount of 
waste are met.  
Work in 2016 began developing the basis to show 
the operational feasibility of the direct disposal of ER 
salt waste. Here, the emphasis has been on the 
transportability of the proposed vessels. Calculations 
of dose, criticality, and temperatures showed that the 
proposed option was feasible without the need to 
secure funding to modify the facility.  
As regards WIPP, two PCS would be loaded and 
sealed into HFEF-5 canisters. In turn, one or two 
HFEF-5 canisters could be loaded into a RH-TRU 72-
B transportation cask for shipment. Although the ER 
salt waste is far below any criticality concern, funding 
may be required sometime in the future to amend the 
RH-TRAMPAC and indirectly the WIPP WAC to 
allow higher fissile amounts in a container.  
The RH-TRAMPAC and indirectly the WIPP 
WAC would also need to be modified to allow ~90 W 
(Table 1) heat loads for 45 payload canisters 
containing the Mark IV ER salt waste for disposal in 
2023 (Fig. 1). Furthermore, WIPP specific PA codes 
will need to be used to provide the basis that ER salt 
waste does not materially alter the safety case. 
Smaller and larger PCS were also considered to 
determine the feasibility and if any advantages 
occurred. One path forward is to develop a small PSC 
that will hold between 4 and 8 kg of ER salt waste. 
Between 400 and 200 PSCs would be produced. The 
primary advantage of using a smaller PSC would be to 
avoid having to dilute the Mark IV ER salt waste to 
shipment and disposal in the RH-TRU 72-B payload 
canister and make use of the readily available 
TRUPACT-II transportation cask.  
Existing overpack containers for the standard 55-
gallon drum payload have insufficient shielding for 
ER salt waste. This option would require developing 
an inner container for the 55-gallon drum payload and 
amending the TRUPACT-II CoC. Although feasible, 
this option will have to be compared with the 
alternative option of modifying the RH-TRU 72-B 
CoC to accept the larger fissile masses in the currently 
proposed PSC.  
The primary advantage of a larger PSC would be 
to make efficient use of canisters for DOE-managed 
SNF, which would be shipped to a repository along 
with the entire inventory of DOE-managed SNF. The 
disadvantage to this approach is that the disposition of 
ER salt waste would be linked to that of the DOE-
managed SNF. Furthermore, this approach would 
reduce the ability to use the other two disposal 
pathways: WIPP or deep boreholes (i.e., the current 
proposed size for the PSC offers sufficient flexibility 
for a viable disposal pathway). 
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